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Abstract 
The costs of support for electricity from renewable energy sources are an issue of 
concern for governments all over the world. The cost-effectiveness of such support is 
one of the main criteria to assess the success of policy instruments. However, significant 
confusion exists in the literature about which costs should be minimised. Some authors 
define the concept of cost-effectiveness as that which minimises the generation costs of 
renewable energy. Others define it as that which minimises the costs of support. In this 
paper, the optimisation problems corresponding to each of the approaches are formally 
stated, the corresponding optimality conditions are obtained, the optimal solutions of 
both approaches are compared and some mechanism of transfer of rents from consumers 
to producers, with good properties, are proposed. 
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1. Introduction 
The costs of support for electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) are 
an issue of important concern for governments worldwide (International Energy Agency 
(IEA), 2011). In the European Union, in every Member State, support schemes are 
being adjusted, and such reforms are needed in order to ensure their cost-effectiveness 
(European Commission 2012).    
The main criteria to assess the success of policy instruments of support for RES-
E are effectiveness (achievement of a certain target) and cost-effectiveness (the 
achievement of the target at the lowest possible cost). 
Which costs should be minimised? The answer depends on the approach being 
adopted. Some authors define the concept of cost-effectiveness as that which complies 
with the equimarginality principle, i.e., minimisation of RES-E generation costs. Many 
others, including important organisations (European Commission, International Energy 
Agency, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) define it as “the lowest costs of 
support” generally equating it with the minimisation of consumer costs.  
Rarely do supporters of one approach argue along the same lines as those of the 
other approach. Those defending the minimisation of RES-E generation costs do not 
usually mention support costs, whereas those supporting the minimum policy costs 
approach seldom argue in favour of minimisation of generation costs. This is an 
important issue to analyse, bearing in mind that both approaches have been used and 
will be used to justify different types of policies (instruments and design elements). It is 
particularly important in the European Union, where there is a lively debate on the 
harmonisation or non-harmonisation of support schemes and the instruments that would 
be more “cost-efficient” to implement (see European Commission 2012, Council of 
European Energy Regulators (CEER) 2012, del Río et al 2012, among others). 
 3
In del Río and Cerdá (2014) the policy implications of these different 
interpretations of the cost-effectiveness of renewable electricity support are studied. The 
minimum generation cost approach tends to favour technological-neutrality in RES-E 
support and usually advocates the use of Tradable Green Certificates schemes without 
banding. In contrast, the “minimum policy costs” approach favours technology-specific 
instruments and, in particular, Feed-in tariffs with support levels differentiated by 
technologies.  
The objectives of this paper are the following: a) to state formally the 
mathematical problems corresponding to each of the approaches, b) to obtain the 
optimality conditions for each of those problems, c) to relate the optimal solution of 
both approaches, d) to propose some mechanisms of transfer of rents from consumers to 
RES-E producers, for which the optimal solution in both approaches is the same. 
The methodology of this paper is based on formal analysis. Some analytical 
results are presented. We restrict our analysis to the RES-E sector, i.e., we do not take 
into account either the effects on the whole electricity system or impacts on the 
economy as a whole2. For the sake of simplicity, we further assume that it is electricity 
consumers who pay for RES-E support (i.e., not taxpayers), which is generally the case, 
at least in the EU (Teckenburg et al 2011, del Río et al 2012). They pay a surcharge for 
the RES-E policy in their electricity bills. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section refers to cost-effectiveness 
as minimisation of RES-E generation costs. In Section 3, the cost-effectiveness as 
minimisation of consumer costs is studied.  The relationship between both approaches is 
analysed in Section 4. Some interesting mechanisms of transfer of rents from consumers 
to RES-E producers are proposed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
2 In particular, we disregard the so-called merit-order effects. 
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2. Cost-effectiveness as minimisation of RES-E generation costs 
Several contributions in the RES-E literature have followed this approach, 
including Schmalensee (2011), Fürsch et al (2010), Green and Yatchew (2012), 
Borenstein (2011), Joskow (2011), Heal (2010) and Aune et al (2012)3. 
In this paper, we consider levelized costs of RES-E generation. Levelized costs 
can be defined as the “ratio of total lifetime expenses versus total expected outputs, 
expressed in terms of the present value equivalent” (Nuclear Energy Agency and 
International Energy Agency, 2005). Therefore, levelized cost is the price at which 
electricity must be generated from a specific source to break even over the lifetime of 
the project. It is an economic assessment of the cost of the energy-generating system, 
including all the costs over its lifetime: initial investment, operations and maintenance, 
cost of fuel, cost of capital and an assumed rate for each plant type, and is very useful in 
calculating the costs of generation from different sources.  
Levelized costs form the basis of much of the discussion in policy circles over 
the costs of different technologies for electricity generation and have been estimated 
frequently over the last twenty-five years (Allan et al, 2011). 
In what follows, we formally define the mathematical problem at hand. 
Let us assume that we have technologies and locations 1, 2,...,n.  
For each  1, 2,..., ,i n   
iq  is the quantity produced. It is assumed that 0 ,i iq q  where 0iq   is the maximum 
quantity which can be produced with technology and location i  because of physical and  
technical constraints. 
                                                 
3 An example of the line of reasoning of this approach is the following sentence in Schmalensee (2011, 
p.9): “Ex post efficiency as regards the top-line twenty percent target requires E.U.-wide equalization of 
the marginal cost of producing electricity from renewable energy”. 
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( )i iC q  is the total generation cost corresponding to technology and location i. It is 
assumed that ( )i iC q  is a non-negative function, of class 
(2)C  and convex (that is 
  0).i iC q     
1
n
i
i
Q q

  is the total quantity of renewable electricity generated, using technologies 
and locations 1,2,..., .n   
 1 2
1
, ,..., ( )
n
n i i
i
C q q q C q

  is the RES-E total generation cost.                                           
Let us assume that a RES-E target *Q  is given. 
Then, the problem to be solved, if the objective is the minimization of the RES-
E generation costs is the following: 
 
 
Problem 1 
 
1 2
1 2, ,..., 1
*
1
*
, ,..., ( )
subject to: 
                0 , for 1, 2,...,
where 0 is given.
n
n
n i iq q q i
n
i
i
i i
Min C q q q C q
q Q
q q i n
Q




  


  
 
       The conditions defining the optimal solution of Problem 1 are presented in the 
following Proposition. 
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Proposition 1. 
The optimal solution of Problem 1  * * *1 2, ,..., ,nq q q  is characterised by the following 
conditions:    * *
1
,
n
i
i
q Q

  with: 
* *0,   (0) ,  i iq if C                    (1)      
* *,   ( ) ,i i i iq q if C q                    (2) 
 * * *0, ,   ( ) ,i i i iq q if C q             (3) 
where 
*
* *.dC MC
dQ
                                                             (4) 
The proof is in the Appendix. 
       The interpretation of the optimality conditions is the following: 
 Those technology segments and sites with marginal costs above *MC  would not 
be deployed at all (1). 
 Technology segments and sites for which the marginal cost of last unit is less 
than (or equal to) *MC have to be used in their entirety (2).  
 The rest of the technologies and sites have to be deployed until the marginal cost 
curve intersects *MC (3). 
       Therefore, the set of all technologies and locations  1, 2,..., n  can be partitioned in 
the following way: 
  
 1, 2,..., ,N B En J J J    
where  *: (0) ,  N iJ i C MC   *: ( )  and B i iJ i C q MC   * *: ( ) .E i iJ i C q MC   
If ,Ni J  technology and location i would not be deployed. 
If ,Bi J  technology and location i would be fully deployed until reaching its bound. 
       Technologies and locations ,Ei J  would be deployed until their respective 
marginal cost curve intersects *.MC  
       Some authors define the concept of cost-effectiveness as that which complies with 
the “equimarginal” principle, as defined in the environmental economics literature (see 
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Tietenberg, 2008)4. However, in accordance with Proposition 1, strictly speaking, 
equimarginality is only satisfied for technologies and sites belonging to the set .EJ   
In case there are no bounds to the quantity to be deployed for each 
technology/location, the cost-effectiveness solution can be obtained easily as a corollary 
of the previous proposition. 
 
Corollary 1. 
If in Problem 1, the constraints ,  for 1,2,..., .i iq q i n   are removed, the optimal 
solution of the problem   * * *1 2, ,..., ,nq q q  is characterised by the following conditions:    
* *
1
,
n
i
i
q Q

  with: 
* *0,   (0) ,  i iq if C                          
 * * *0, ,   ( ) ,i i i iq q if C q              
where 
*
* *.dC MC
dQ
                                                                        
The proof is in the Appendix. 
 
3. Cost-effectiveness as minimisation of consumer costs 
Many contributions in the RES-E literature follow this approach, including Haas 
et al (2011), Verbruggen (2009), Verbruggen and Lauber (2012), Klessmann et al 
(2011), Huber et al (2004), Bergek and Jacobsson (2010), Ragwitz et al (2007), 
European Commission (2008, 2012), Steinhilber et al (2011), Resch et al (2009), 
                                                 
4 “The least cost means of achieving an environmental target will have been achieved when the marginal 
costs of all possible means of achievement are equal” (Tietenberg, 2008, p. 18). 
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Mitchell et al (2011), IEA (2008), IEA (2011), Mendonza (2007), Couture and Gagnon 
(2009) and de Jager et al (2011)5. 
Renewable energy technologies compete with other conventional generation 
technologies as well as with each other in order to penetrate the electricity market. 
However, since their private costs are generally higher than the private costs of the 
conventional energy sources, they require financial support6. This can be provided 
through different instruments. We are assuming that electricity consumers (not the 
taxpayers) pay the RES-E support. Thus, a goal for policy makers could be to have a 
certain penetration of RES-E (at the level of Q*) at the minimum costs for consumers.  
   Rents or profits, defined as transfers from consumers to producers above RES-
E generation costs, have to be considered.  Some surplus is needed in order to make 
future RES-E investments attractive. Producers use short-term rents to pay for 
investment costs (Hirth and Ueckert, 2012) and therefore, reducing generators´ rents too 
much might leave them in a situation where they cannot pay back the investments they 
have made and go bankrupt.  
For the minimization of the policy costs approach, the aim is to minimise total 
consumer costs, which is the addition of the total amount of rent transferred from 
electricity consumers to producers above RES-E generation costs and generation costs. 
Let us define formally the corresponding problem: 
To all the variables, functions and parameters introduced in Section 2, we add 
the following functions: 
                                                 
5 An example of the line of reasoning of this approach is the following sentence in Mitchell et al (2011, 
p.55): “Static efficiency can be measured as cost-effectiveness or a comparison of total support received 
relative to generation costs”. 
6 Private cost estimates for new capacity are levelized costs: they reflect the present discounted value of 
the total cost of constructing, maintaining, and operating an electricity-generating plant over its entire 
lifetime and are expressed in terms of real cents per kWh (Greenstone and Looney 2012). The private 
plus the external costs of energy use (i.e., the negative impacts of energy use on health, the environment 
and national security) leads to the social cost of energy use. 
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( )i iT q  is the total amount of rent transferred from electricity consumers to producers 
above RES-E generation costs for technology and location  1, 2,..., .i n  It is assumed 
that ( )i iT q  is a non-negative function, of class 
(2)C  and that i iT C  is convex (that is 
 ( ) 0).i i i iT q C q      
 1 2
1
, ,..., ( )
n
n i i
i
T q q q T q

  is the total amount of rent transferred from electricity 
consumers to RES-E producers above generation costs.                                           
The problem to be solved, if the objective is the minimization of consumer costs 
is the following: 
Problem 2A 
 
1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2, ,..., 1 1
*
1
*
, ,..., ( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., ) ( ) ( )
subject to: 
                0 , for 1, 2,...,
where 0 is given.
n
n n
n n n i i i iq q q i i
n
i
i
i i
Min C q q q T q q q C q q q T q C q
q Q
q q i n
Q
 

   

  

 


 
The conditions to be satisfied by the optimal solution of Problem 2A are 
presented in Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. 
The optimal solution of Problem 2A  1 2, ,..., ,nq q q    is characterised by the following 
conditions:    *
1
,
n
i
i
q Q

  with: 
0,   (0) (0) ,  i i iq if T C                        (5)      
,   ( ) ( ) ,i i i i i iq q if T q C q                        (6) 
 0, ,   ( ) ( ) ,i i i i i iq q if T q C q                   (7) 
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where 
 1 2, ,..., .ndC q q q
dQ

  
 

                                                                            (8) 
The proof of Proposition 2 is immediate, given Proposition 1 and the similarity between 
problems 1 and 2A. 
However, the solution of Problem 2A does not imply that the problem of 
minimisation of consumer costs is solved, because in Problem 2A the functions 
 1 2, ,..., ,nT T T  that is the specific mechanism of transfer of rents from consumers to 
producers, is given. But a specific mechanism may not be adequate to minimise the 
consumer costs, even if the optimality conditions for Problem 2A are applied. Then, a 
second stage has to be introduced, in order to minimise total consumer costs. 
Let us assume that a set of mechanisms of transfer of rents from electricity 
consumers to RES-E producers  1 2, ,..., ,  for ,j j jnT T T j J  where each element j of the 
family verifies the assumptions introduced in the statement of Problem 2A, is given.  
Then, the following problem has to be solved: 
Problem 2B: 
 *min ,j
j J
C
   
where        * 1 2
1 1
, ,..., ,
n n
j j j
n i i i i
i i
C C q q q T q C q    
 
       
and  1 2, ,..., nq q q    is the optimal solution of Problem 2A for the mechanism 
 1 2, ,..., .j j jnT T T  
Therefore, in order to minimise the total policy costs, the following steps have to be 
followed: 
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1. Define a set of mechanisms  1 2, ,..., ,  for .j j jnT T T j J  Each mechanisms j J  
has to give producers enough surplus to make future RES-E investments 
attractive. 
2. For each mechanism ,j J  solve Problem 2A. 
3. Solve Problem 2B. 
 
Then, a mechanism *j J  is chosen, and a vector of optimal quantities 
 1 2, ,..., nq q q   is obtained, with *
1
,
n
i
i
q Q

  corresponding to the optimal solution of 
Problem 2A for the mechanism  * * *1 2, ,..., .j j jnT T T  The total cost to be paid by electricity 
consumers is equal to      * *1 2
1 1
, ,..., .
n n
j j
n i i i i
i i
C q q q T q C q    
 
    
 
4. Relationship between both approaches 
       In this Section, we will use some counterexamples to show that 1) minimisation of 
generation costs does not imply that consumer costs are minimised, and, 2) 
minimisation of consumer costs does not imply that generation costs are minimised. 
  
4.1 Minimisation of generation costs does not imply that consumer costs are minimised  
       Let us assume that generation costs are minimised. This does not imply that 
consumer costs are also minimised (del Río and Cerdá, 2014). Let us justify this with a 
simple example. 
       Let us assume that the aggregated RES-E marginal generation costs are given by 
the function:  
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3 3
2 3
1
( ), if 0
( ) ( ), if 
( ), if 
a
C Q Q q
MC Q C Q q Q Q
C Q Q Q
       


  
where ( )aMC Q  is strictly increasing. The quota 
*Q  is given and is such that 
*
3 .q Q Q    In this case, generation costs are minimised producing 
* * * *
1 2 3 2 3( , , ) (0, , ),q q q q q  where * *2 3,q Q q   and the marginal generation cost of the last 
unit of generation needed to comply with the quota is 
*
* 2 2
2
( )dC qMC
dq
 (optimal solution 
of Problem 1). 
       Let us assume for the moment that support is set at the level *.MC  The total costs 
of public support (falling to consumers) would be equal to * *MC Q  (the area below 
the line *MC  and between 0  and *Q ). Part of this support from consumers covers the 
total generation costs, whereas the rest (the area between *MC and the aggregated 
marginal generation curve) represents the producer surplus. In this case, the specific 
mechanism of transfer of rents from consumers to producers is the producer surplus, 
and can be defined as  1 2 3, ,T T T  such that  
* *
*
( ), if ( )  
( )
0, if ( )   
i i i i
i i
i i
MC C q C q MC
T q
C q MC
       
  
       In this example, Problem 1 and Problem 2A have the same optimal solution. With 
this support mechanism, generation costs are minimised. However, it is possible to find 
other support mechanisms for which generation costs are also minimised but with lower 
consumer costs, such as the following: 
* *
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3*
2 2
( ), if 0
( ) 0, ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( )
0, if 
MC C q q q
T q T q T q C q C q
q q
           
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       For 1 2 3( , , )T T T , Problem 1 and Problem 2A have also the same optimal solution, but 
the consumer costs are lower than those corresponding to the producer surplus, that is 
mechanism  1 2 3, , ,T T T because *3 3( ) .C q MC    
       In this example, it has been assumed that the marginal generation costs are strictly 
increasing and therefore the transfers from consumers to producers (above the 
generation costs) are strictly positive, for each of the technologies and locations which 
are fully or partially deployed. If the function of marginal generation costs was a step 
function, the transfers from consumers to producers would be zero for all technologies 
and locations, when the mechanism 1 2 3( , , )T T T  is used, and would even be zero for the 
most expensive among the technologies and locations deployed (corresponding to 2i   
in this case), when the standard producer surplus is used. If some surplus is needed in 
order to make future RES-E investment attractive, other mechanisms have to be 
considered in this case. 
 
4.2 Minimisation of consumer costs does not imply that generation costs are minimised 
       In the following example, the optimal solutions of problems 1 and 2A are 
completely different. 
       Let us assume that the marginal costs are the following: 
1 1 1( ) 40, for 0 25C q q      
2 2 2( ) 42, for 0 30C q q     
3 3 3( ) 44, for 0 30C q q     
       The quota * 50Q   is given. The optimal solution of Problem 1 is 
 * * *1 1 2 325, 25, 0 .q q q q      
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       Let us consider now the mechanism of transfer of rents from consumers to 
producers, defined by: 
1 1 1( ) 6, for 0 25T q q     
2 2 2( ) 2, for 0 30T q q     
3 3 3( ) 1, for 0 30T q q     
       The optimal solution of Problem 2A is 
 1 2 2 30, 30, 20 .q q q q       
       Therefore, with this mechanism the generation costs are not minimised. In fact, the 
optimal solutions of problems 1 and 2A are very different. 
       In Section 5, some mechanisms of transfer of rents from consumers to producers 
(different from the mechanisms used in Section 4) are presented, for which Problem 1 
and Problem 2A have the same optimal solution. 
 
 
5. Some mechanisms for which Problem 1 and Problem 2A have the same optimal 
solution 
        In this section, two classes of mechanisms of transfer of rents from consumers to 
producers are proposed, which have the property that the optimal solution of problems 1 
and 2A is the same. They also permit a positive surplus to be given to all the 
technologies and locations which have to be deployed, even in the case of step functions 
for marginal costs. 
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Proposition 3. 
Let us assume that 1 2( , ,..., )nT T T  is such that  
( ) ( ),   0,    .i i i iT q C q where is given        
Then, Problem 1 and Problem 2A have the same optimal solution, and moreover 
     * * * * * *1 2 1 2, ,..., 1 , ,...,n nC q q q C q q q    
The proof is in the Appendix.   
       With this proportional mechanism, the amount to be paid by consumers to each of 
the producers is equal to the cost of generation plus an additional rent which is a fixed 
proportion of the corresponding generation cost. Then, the higher the cost of the 
technology and location, the higher the transfer of rent from consumers to producers 
(assuming it is deployed). 
 
Proposition 4. 
Let us assume that 1 2( , ,..., )nT T T  is such that  
( ) ,   0,    .i iT q K where K K is given      
Then, Problem 1 and Problem 2A have the same optimal solution, and moreover 
   * * * * * * *1 2 1 2, ,..., , ,...,n nC q q q KQ C q q q    
The proof is in the Appendix.   
       With this constant mechanism, the amount to be paid by consumers to each of the 
producers is equal to the cost of generation plus an additional rent which is a fixed 
quantity per unit of production, independently of the cost of generation (assuming it is 
deployed). 
       Let us compare now the two mechanisms introduced in this section from the point 
of view of the consumer costs. Let us assume that     and K    are given, in such 
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a way that each of the mechanisms give to producers enough surplus to make future 
RES-E investments attractive. Which of the two mechanisms leads to smaller costs for 
consumers? The answer is in the following proposition, which is easily obtained from 
Propositions 3 and 4.  
 
Proposition 5 
The constant mechanism (defined in Proposition 4) is better than the proportional 
mechanism (defined in Proposition 3) from the point of view of minimisation of 
consumer costs if and only if  * * * *1 2, ,..., .nC q q q KQ   Otherwise, the proportional 
mechanism is better than the constant mechanism7. 
The proof is in the Appendix. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper tries to contribute to the clarification of the meaning of “cost-
effectiveness” in the RES-E support literature, comparing the two main interpretations 
of cost-effectiveness regarding RES-E support. This clarification/comparison is 
important, given their policy relevance and the fact that rarely do supporters of one 
approach argue the same lines as those of the other approach. It allows us to take into 
account the conceptual framework and assumptions behind the analyses of those 
making proposals for specific instruments and design elements to support RES-E. In 
other words, it contextualises the contributions of those making policy prescriptions. 
In this paper, the mathematical programming problems corresponding to each of 
the approaches have been formally defined and the corresponding optimality conditions 
have been obtained applying the Khun-Tucker conditions.   
                                                 
7 If * * * *1 2( , ,..., )nC q q q KQ   both mechanims are indifferent from that point of view. 
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Some authors define the concept of cost-effectiveness as that which complies 
with the “equimarginal” principle, as defined in the environmental economics literature. 
However, we have seen in Proposition 1 that, strictly speaking, equimarginality is not 
necessarily satisfied by all the technologies and sites to be deployed. Same technologies 
and sites can be deployed in their entirety (when they have a bound) in such a way that 
the marginal cost of the last unit (corresponding to that technology and site) is smaller 
than the marginal cost corresponding to the point in which the aggregated marginal cost 
intersects the vertical line corresponding to the given quota for renewables. 
       Two simple counterexamples have been presented to show that 1) minimisation of 
generation costs does not imply that consumer costs are minimised, and, 2) 
minimisation of consumer costs does not imply that generation costs are minimised. 
       Two families of mechanisms of transfer of rents from consumers to producers for 
which the optimal solution in both approaches is the same have been proposed. The 
producers corresponding to the technologies and sites with higher marginal costs would 
prefer the proportional mechanism, the others would prefer the constant mechanism. 
These transfers account for less cost to the consumers than the standard producer 
surplus. 
       This paper has focused on static efficiency i.e., it has not considered technological 
changes or learning induced by RES-E support schemes, which would lead to a 
downward shift in the marginal cost curve for RES-E generation and, thus, lower policy 
costs, depending on whether consumers or producers benefit from those technological 
changes. Further research could analyse whether those shifts are really induced by the 
RES-E support instrument or by other factors, which instrument (FITs, TGCs or any 
other) is a more appropriate complement to public R&D and is likely to induce 
technological changes better, the extent to which the aforementioned savings in policy 
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costs (if any) offset the policy costs which induce those technological changes in the 
first place and whether those technological changes translate into lower policy costs 
(reductions in MC*) or a greater producer surplus. 
       The impact of different RES-E instruments on policy risks and, thus, on generation 
and policy costs should be the focus of further research, both theoretically (i.e., with 
formal models dealing with risks) and empirically (analysing those risks in countries 
with different instruments). 
 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1  
       The optimal solution of Problem 1 has to satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, 
which are necessary conditions of local optimality. In order to apply these conditions, 
the corresponding Lagrange multipliers have to be introduced. Let´s define the 
following Lagrange multipliers: 
  is associated with the constraint *
1
,
n
i
i
q Q

  therefore ** *,dC MCdQ     
i  is associated with the constraint 0 ,  for 1,2,..., ,iq i n    
i  is associated with the constraint ,  for 1,2,..., .i iq q i n   
       The Lagrangian is 
   *1 2 1 2 , 1 2
1 1 1 1
, ,..., , , , ,..., , ,..., ( )
n n n n
n n n i i i i i i i i
i i i i
L q q q C q Q q q q q         
   
           
        Let us apply now the Kuhn-Tucker conditions: 
1) ( ) 0,  for 1,2,...,i i i i
i
L C q i n
q
           
*
1
2) )
  ) 0 , for 1,2,...,
n
i
i
i i
a q Q
b q q i n


  
   
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3) ) 0,  for 1, 2,...,
  ) 0,  for 1, 2,...,
i
i
a i n
b i n


 
    
 
4) ) 0,  for 1, 2,...,
   ) 0,  for 1, 2,...,
i i
i i i
a q i n
b q q i n


 
     
A) Let us assume that 0 By 4 ),  it is =0.i iq b     
       By 2), it is 0. Then, by 1), we have (0) .i i iC         
       Therefore, * * * *0,  with 0, 0, (0) ,i i i iq C       satisfies conditions 1), 2 b), 3) 
and 4). 
B) Let us assume that By 4 ),  it is =0.i i iq q a     
       By 2), it is 0. Then, by 1), we have (0) .i i iC        
       Therefore, * * * *, with 0, 0, ( ) ,i i i i i iq q C q       satisfies conditions 1), 2 b), 3) 
and 4). 
C) Let us assume that 0 By 4 ),  it is 0, and by 4 ) it is 0.i i i iq q a b        
       Then, by 1), we have ( ) .i iC q     
       Therefore, * * * * *(0, ),  with 0, 0, ( ) ,i i i i i iq q C q       satisfies conditions 1), 2 b), 
3) and 4). 
       Consequently, the solution  * * *1 2, ,..., ,nq q q  satisfying the Kuhn-Tucker conditions is 
such that * *
1
,
n
i
i
q Q

  with: 
* * * *0,  if (0) ,  with 0 and 0,i i i iq C         
* * * *,  if ( ) ,  with 0 and 0,i i i i i iq q C q        
 * * * * *0, ,  if ( ) ,  with 0 and 0.i i i i i iq q C q        
       The sufficient conditions are satisfied because the problem is convex: the objective 
function is convex (the addition of convex functions is also convex) and the feasible set 
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is convex because all the functions defining the constraints are linear. Therefore, the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are also sufficient for global optimality ▄ 
 
Proof of Corollary 1 
       The proof is immediate, just taking 0,  for 1, 2,...,i i n    in the proof of 
Proposition 1 
▄ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
          
0 0
( ) ( ) ,  for 1, 2,..., .
i iq q
i i i i i iT q T x dx C x dx C q i n         
       Then, the objective function for Problem 2A is 
 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1
1 2
1 1 1
, ,..., ( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( , ,..., ),
n n
n n n i i i i
i i
n n n
i i i i i i n
i i i
C q q q T q q q C q q q T q C q
C q C q C q C q q q  
 
  
    
     
 
  

 
where  1 2, ,..., nC q q q  is the objective function of Problem 1. 
       As both problems have the same constraints, and their objective functions are 
related as has been shown in the previous lines, they have the same optimal solution and 
the Proposition holds ▄ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
        
0 0
( ) ,  for 1, 2,..., .
i iq q
i i i iT q T x dx Kdx Kq i n       
       Then, the objective function for Problem 2A is 
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 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1
1 2
1 1 1
, ,..., ( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( , ,..., ),
n n
n n n i i i i
i i
n n n
i i i i n
i i i
C q q q T q q q C q q q T q C q
Kq C q K q C q q q
 
  
    
   
 
  

 
where  1 2, ,..., nC q q q  is the objective function of Problem 1. 
      As both problems have the same constraints, and their objective functions are 
related as has been shown in the previous lines, they have the same optimal solution and 
moreover,  
 * * * * * * * * * * *1 2 1 2 1 2
1
, ,..., ( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., )
n
n i n n
i
C q q q K q C q q q KQ C q q q

     ▄ 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
       The constant mechanism is better than the proportional mechanism from the point 
of view of minimisation of consumer costs if and only if the value of the objective 
function for the optimal solution, obtained in Proposition 4, is   than the value of the 
objective function for the optimal solution, obtained in Proposition 3. That is, if and 
only if 
       * * * * * * * * * * *1 2 1 2 1 2, ,..., 1 , ,..., , ,...,n n nKQ C q q q C q q q KQ C q q q      ▄ 
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